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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN TERMS OF THE PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUSTICE ACT 
 
RC Williams  
 
  
1 Introduction 
 
Bhugwan v JSE Ltd1 is the first (and, as at the time of writing, the only) High Court 
decision to place under a strong lens the issue of what, for the purposes of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”), constitutes a decision 
reviewable under the Act, as distinct from an inchoate decision (or a decision not yet 
made at all) that is not susceptible to such review.  The judgment in this case stands 
as a warning to persons who are considering seeking relief in terms of the Act not to 
jump the gun (as it turned out that the applicant in this case had done) in applying for 
a review. If an application for review is premature, in the sense that no decision has 
yet been made, it is doomed to failure.  The judgment is also a warning to 
administrative decision-makers to apply their minds to the appropriate juncture at 
which to take the crucial step that the law will regard as an “administrative action” 
that is susceptible to judicial review, and to ensure that their utterances and conduct 
prior to that juncture cannot be construed as a “decision of an administrative nature”, 
as contemplated in PAJA. This discussion indicates the pragmatic significance of 
what might otherwise seem to be a point of law of little practical importance, namely 
what precisely constitutes a “decision”. 
 
2 The facts 
 
The essential facts of the case were that the applicant, Bhugwan, had been 
employed as a stockbroker by a firm called Cahn Shapiro, but had left the firm under 
something of a cloud.  In March 2008, Bhugwan subscribed for shares in a company, 
Groombridge Securities (Pty) Ltd (“Groombridge”), in terms of an agreement which 
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included a condition precedent to the effect that that he would be “accepted by the 
JSE [Johannesburg Stock Exchange] as being fit and proper” to be a director or 
shareholder of the company.  The “fit and proper” requirements of the Equity Rules 
of the JSE stipulated in rule 4.10 that:  
 
4.10.1  An officer or non-executive director of a member, or a 
shareholder who is a natural person and who directly or 
indirectly holds in excess of 10% of the issued shares of a 
member, must, subject to any waiver by the JSE -  
4.10.1.1 be of full legal capacity;  
4.10.1.2  not be an unrehabilitated insolvent; and  
4.10.1.3  comply with such criteria of good character and high business 
integrity as the JSE deems fit.  
4.10.2 In determining whether a person complies with Rule 4.10.1.3, 
the JSE will take into account, inter alia , whether the person 
has been -  
…. 
4.10.2.4 the subject of a formal investigation by any regulatory or 
government agency;  
…. 
4.10.2.4 refused entry to or expelled from any profession or vocation or 
been dismissed or requested to resign from any office or 
employment, or from any fiduciary office or similar position of 
trust. 
 
On 18 April 2008, the company secretary of the JSE sent an e-mail to one of the 
directors of Groombridge which concluded with the following statement: 
 
The JSE has information at its disposal which indicates that Mr Kamal 
Bhugwan does not comply with such criteria of good character and high 
business integrity as the JSE deems fit. 
 
This was followed by a letter on 19 May 2008 from the JSE to Bhugwan’s attorney 
stating that (emphasis added):  
 
It has come to the attention of the JSE that there are certain facts and 
circumstances that may indicate that your client does not comply with the 
requisite criteria of good character and high business integrity. 
 
After sketching the background circumstances in which Bhugwan’s employment with 
his prior employer, Cahn Shapiro, had been terminated, this letter continues 
(emphasis added): 
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The JSE requests your client to furnish the JSE and Groombridge with all the 
facts and information at his disposal that will indicate that he satisfies the 
JSE’s fit and proper requirements notwithstanding the serious allegations of 
improper conduct that have been leveled against him. … The JSE will, after 
receipt of your client’s reply, consider all the facts and information at its 
disposal and decide whether Mr Bhugwan does indeed comply with the JSE’s 
fit and proper requirements. 
 
An impasse then ensued in which Bhugwan declined to respond substantively to the 
JSE’s invitation to supply facts and information.  In the result, Groombridge invoked 
the non-fulfilment of the condition precedent in the agreement whereby Bhugwan’s 
right to subscribe for shares in the company was dependent on his being accepted 
by the JSE as a fit and proper person to be a director or shareholder of a member of 
the JSE.  
 
In hindsight, Bhugwan would have been better advised to respond by directing his 
grievance to Groombridge, and to argue that it was premature for the latter to 
contend that the condition precedent in their agreement had definitively failed. 
However, Bhugwan chose instead to embark on litigation with the JSE. 
 
3 The application to the High Court for review 
 
Bhugwan brought an application in the High Court, contending2 that the JSE had 
taken a “decision” that constituted “administrative action”, as defined in section 1 of 
PAJA, and in particular that the JSE’s e-mail of 18 April 2008, quoted above, 
“constituted a final and definitive decision which had immediate and direct legal 
consequences” for Bughwan, or alternatively that the e-mail “constituted a 
preliminary decision which would have serious consequences” for Bhugwan.  In his 
notice of motion, Bhugwan sought an order inter alia: 
 
setting aside the decision of [the JSE] to find [sic] that the applicant does not 
comply with the [JSE’s] criteria of good character and high business integrity 
in terms of section 4.10.3 of the Equity Rules. 
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In response, the JSE contended3 that no “decision” had been taken, as 
contemplated in section 1 of PAJA.  It was clear,4 for the reasons discussed below, 
that if the court were to find that no “decision”, as contemplated in PAJA, had been 
taken by the JSE in this regard, Bhugwan’s application for review would be still-born 
and would have to be dismissed, and that all other issues in the case would fall 
away. 
 
4 The threshold requirement for justiciability in respect of the review of an 
administrative act in terms of the Constitution 
 
In Gamevest (Pty) Ltd v Regional Land Claims Commissioner, Northern Province 
and Mpumalanga5 the events in question had occurred prior to the coming into force 
of PAJA.  Consequently, the review of the actions in question in that case had to be 
adjudicated in the context of justiciability in respect of an “administrative act” in terms 
of the Constitution,6 and not in terms of PAJA.  
 
Section 33 of the Constitution refers to an “administrative act” but, unlike PAJA, does 
not equate this to a “decision”. However, in its gloss on section 33 of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gamevest referred7 to: “the very first 
and ineluctable requirement for judicial review, viz a decision by the 
respondent/defendant”. This point is now explicit in PAJA, where section 1 defines 
“administrative action” as a “decision” of an administrative nature. This was 
highlighted by Nugent JA in Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public 
Works:8 as follow: “[A]t the core of the definition of administrative action is the idea of 
action (a decision) of an administrative nature taken by a public body or functionary”.  
In Bhugwan v JSE Ltd, the High Court cited the Gamevest decision, and quoted from 
Olivier JA’s judgment in the latter case in which he said:  
 
the words administrative action … emphasise the very first question to 
be asked and answered in any review proceeding: what is the 
                                               
3  Ibid at para [3]. 
4  See the judgment at para [3]. 
5  2003 1 SA 373 (SCA). 
6  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
7  At para [11]. 
8  2005 6 SA 313 (SCA), 2005 (10) BCLR 931; [2005] 3 All SA 333 at para 22. 
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administrative act which is sought to be reviewed and set aside? 
Absent such an act, the application for a review is still-born. 9 
 
Olivier JA then went on to say:10  
 
What is an administrative act for the purpose of justiciability? There is no neat, 
ready-made definition in our case law, but in Hira and Another v Booysen and 
Another 1992 (4) SA 69 (A) Corbett CJ at 93A - B required, for common-law 
review, the non-performance or wrong performance of a statutory duty or 
power; where the duty/power is essentially a decision-making one and the 
person or body concerned has taken a decision, a review is available. 
 
In this manner, the judgment in Bhugwan sought to interpret the justiciability of a 
“decision”, in terms of PAJA11 consistently with the justiciability of an “administrative 
act” in terms of section 33 of the Constitution.  The court in Bhugwan accepted the 
cautionary words expressed by Lord Steyn in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Ex parte Daly12 that, in evaluating an allegedly decision-making 
process, “context is everything”. 
 
5 Justiciability in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
 
PAJA defines “decision”, but in circular terms (“any decision of an administrative 
nature made, proposed to be made or required to be made ….”) that throw no light 
on the core meaning of the word. The definition goes on to list certain “decisions” 
that are included in the definition, but in terms that assume that what has transpired 
was indeed a “decision”.13  The pivotal issue in Bhugwan was if the JSE had in fact 
made a decision, as defined in PAJA, in regard to whether or not Bhugwan was a “fit 
and proper person” as contemplated in the Equity Rules.  
 
The court commenced its examination of the meaning of decision in the context of 
PAJA by quoting various dictionary definitions, and went on to hold that, for a 
                                               
9   at para [11]. 
10  Ibid at para [12]. 
11  See also in this regard the judgment of Nugent JA in Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Public Works 2005 6 SA 313 (SCA); 2005 (10) BCLR 931; [2005] 3 All SA 333 at para 22. 
12  [2001] 3 All ER 433 (HL) at 447a and quoted with approval by Nugent JA in Aktiebolaget Hässle 
v Triomed (Pty) Ltd 2003 1 SA 155 (SCA), [2002] 4 All SA 138 at para 1. 
13  Bhugwan v JSE Ltd 2010 3 SA 335 (GSJ) at para [8]. 
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decision to have been taken that was amenable to judicial review, “all or at least 
some” of the following steps must have been completed, namely:14 
 
“1.  Save where an authority legitimately acts coercively or of its own 
accord, a final application, request or claim must have been addressed 
by a subject to an authority which exercises statutory or public powers 
to exercise those powers in relation to a set of factual circumstances 
applicable to the subject.  
2.  All relevant information, either presented by the subject or otherwise 
reasonably available must have been gathered (which may require an 
investigative process) and placed before the authority which is to make 
the decision.  
3. There must have been an evaluative process where the authority 
considers all of the information before him or her, identifies which 
components of such information are relevant and which are irrelevant 
and in which the authority assigns, through a process of value 
judgments, a degree of significance to each component of the relevant 
information, regard being had to the relevant statute or other 
empowering provision in terms of which the authority acts.  
4.  A conclusion must have been reached by the authority, pursuant to the 
evaluative process, as to how his or her statutory or public power 
should be exercised in the circumstances.  
5.  There must have been an exercise of the statutory or public power 
based on the conclusion so reached.“ 
 
It is, with respect, not clear how points 2 and 3 above can in any sense be regarded 
as prerequisites for coming to the conclusion that a “decision”, as defined, has been 
made. Indeed, it may be the absence of these factors that is the basis for the 
application to review the decision in question.  The court in Bhugwan15 quoted from 
Baxter, Administrative Law, to the effect that the criterion as to whether or not a 
sufficiently “ripe” action has been taken to constitute a reviewable decision is: 
“whether prejudice has already resulted or is inevitable, irrespective of whether the 
action is complete or not”. 
 
                                               
14  Ibid at para [10]. 
15  Ibid at para [11]. 
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6 Had the JSE taken a “decision” as contemplated in PAJA? 
 
In Bhugwan, Nugent JA said16 that “a simplistic linguistic reading” of the JSE’s e-mail 
of 18 April 2008 did not indicate that a decision had been taken by that entity. As 
was noted above, that e-mail said: “[T]he JSE has information at its disposal which 
indicates that Mr Kamal Bhugwan does not comply with such criteria of good 
character and high business integrity as the JSE deems fit”.  The court observed17 
that the operative word in this email was “indicates”, rather an expression such as 
“confirms”, “establishes” or “proves”, and that: 
 
the letter, properly construed linguistically was to give [Bhugwan] an indication 
of information in possession of [the JSE] which would tend to indicate that he 
did not comply with the requisite requirements. 
 
The court said that it was: 
 
fortified in this linquistic interpretation by the fact that the letter invited further 
discussion of the matter. It does not purport to close the door after a final and 
determinative decision had been made. 
 
The court went on to say that a contextual approach put the matter beyond doubt, in 
that no case was made in Bhugwan’s founding affidavit that he had “applied” to the 
JSE for a determination as to whether or not he satisfied the requirements of Equity 
Rule 4.10, and the court said in this regard that: “[T]here is no basis in law to review 
a so-called decision if the applicant does not make out a case that he had applied for 
such a decision to be made”. 
 
This dictum, with respect, goes too far in elevating an “application” by the affected 
person to a sine qua non for a review in terms of PAJA. There is nothing in the 
language of the Act to justify the inference that this is a prerequisite for review of the 
decision in question. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which an 
administrative act may be set aside on review precisely because it was made 
                                               
16  Ibid at para [27]. 
17  Ibid. 
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precipitately.  In the result, the court held18 that, on the facts, the JSE had not made 
a “decision”, as contemplated in section 1 of PAJA in which it had purported to “close 
the door after a final and determinative decision had been taken”.19 
 
An issue not explored at all in the judgment is that of a “proposed decision”, and how 
this differs from a “decision”. Section 1 of PAJA defines “administrative action” as 
connoting “any decision taken or failure to take a decision”, and goes on to define 
decision (emphasis added) as “any decision of an administrative nature made or 
proposed to be made …” (emphasis added).  It would therefore have sufficed for 
Bhugwan to show that what the JSE had done was to notify him, not of a decision 
already taken, but of a decision proposed to be made.  It is unfortunate that his 
counsel did not press this line of argument, which would have rested on stronger 
ground than the contention that the JSE’s decision was a fait accompli.  Such an 
argument would have obliged the court to make a ruling on the important distinction 
between a decision of an administrative nature that has been made and one that is 
proposed to be made, as contemplated in the definition of “decision” in section 1 of 
PAJA.  
 
It is arguable that the reason why the legislation includes a decision “proposed to be 
made” in the statutory definition of a “decision” was to prevent an administrative 
decision-maker from remaining outside the scope of PAJA by the stratagem of 
saying to the affected party something along the lines of – we have resolved to take 
view x of the matter unless and until you persuade us otherwise.  If the definition of 
“decision” were not wide enough to encompass such a provisional or prima facie 
decision, a decision-maker could ensure that his response remained outside the 
scope of PAJA indefinitely, or at least for a protracted period, as each supply of 
further information by the affected person was deemed inadequate to persuade the 
decision-maker to alter his provisional view. 
 
The argument open to Bhugwan, but unfortunately not advanced by him,20 was that, 
in effect, this was what the JSE had done. In other words, that the impersonal mode 
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of expression in the JSE’s e-mail of 18 April (“The JSE has information at its disposal 
which indicates that Mr Kamal does not comply …”) artfully concealed a decision 
which could just as accurately have been expressed in the active voice (“The JSE 
has information at its disposal on the basis of which it has provisionally decided that 
…”) 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that, in interpreting the definition of “decision” in section 1 of PAJA, the 
critical distinction is between, on the one hand, a decision actually made or proposed 
to be made (both of which fall within the scope of that definition) and a decision 
deferred, (which would fall outside of the definition).  It is for the court to decide, with 
due regard for the nuances of language, into which category the communication from 
the would-be decision-maker falls. In making that decision, the court must of course 
not scrutinise the particular letter, e-mail or other communication in a blinkered 
fashion, but must interpret it in its full context of previous communications and prior 
events.  
 
It is submitted that a preliminary, provisional or prima facie decision is not a decision 
deferred, and consequently falls within the scope of a “decision”, as defined in 
section 1 of PAJA.  
 
It is submitted that the distinction to be drawn in this regard is between, on the one 
hand, a communication by a decision-maker that says in effect – “on the basis of 
what I know, my mind is still open” (which would not be a decision, as defined in 
PAJA), and, on the other hand, a communication that says in effect – “on the basis of 
what I know, I have made a provisional decision, but I could be persuaded to change 
my mind” (which, it is submitted, would be either a decision or a proposed decision, 
as contemplated in PAJA). 
                                                                                                                                                  
20  Bhugwan’s counsel did put forward an argument (see the judgment at para [26]) that the JSE 
had made a “preliminary” decision which (in terms of the decision in Oosthuizen’s Transport (Pty) 
Ltd v MEC, Road Traffic Matters, Mpumalanga 2008 2 SA 570 (T)) constituted a “decision” for 
the purposes of PAJA. In its judgment in the latter case, the court did not explain what 
constituted a “preliminary” decision, but it would seem that the court had in mind in this regard 
not a “provisional” decision but a decision which would form the basis for further decisions. 
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In my view, the facts in Bhugwan are close to the border between these two 
categories.  In particular, the content of the JSE’s e-mail of 18 April 2008, read in 
isolation, teeters on that border. But the JSE’s email of 19 May 2008 to Bhugwan’s 
attorney was unequivocal in stating that (emphasis added): 
 
The JSE will, after receipt of your client’s reply consider all the facts and 
circumstances at its disposal and decide whether Mr Bughwan does indeed 
comply with the JSE’s fit and proper requirements. 
 
The latter e-mail, it is submitted, makes clear that the JSE’s standpoint was not of a 
decision made (even on a provisional, preliminary or prima facie basis) but of a 
decision deferred.  
 
My criticism is therefore not that the decision in Bhugwan was wrong in its 
application of the law to the facts, but that the court failed to take sufficient 
cognizance of the fact that the definition of “decision” in section 1 of PAJA includes a 
decision proposed to be made. Furthermore, that the court failed to articulate and 
apply the distinction, suggested above, between a preliminary, provisional or prima 
facie decision (all of which, it is submitted, constitute a decision as defined in the Act) 
and a decision deferred (which falls outside the definition of “decision” and is 
therefore not amenable to review in terms of PAJA). 
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